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NOTE AND COMMENT 
SALES-LIABILITY FOR TH.E PRESENCE OF MICE AND 0TR.ER UNCOMMON 
THINGS IN Foon.-A group of recent decisions presents a somewhat farci-
cal conformity with Mo11tesq11ieu's thesis that "law" may vary with time and 
geography. It strikingly illustrates, also, the importance of the particular 
theory of liability upon which a suit is predicated. The unusual similarity in 
detail of the operative facts of these cases lends peculiar emphasis to the 
difference in the judgments rendered. 
The plaintiff in Merrill v. Hodson (July, I9I4), 88 Conn. 314, had been 
poisoned by the unwholesomeness of some creamed-sweetbreads, which had 
been prepared by defendant's servants and served to plaintiff in his res-
taurant. The suit, to recover for damage suffered, was based "in both 
pleading and proof" on the theory of an implied warranty that food so 
served was fit to be eaten. In other cases it had been held, and has since 
been held, that the serving of food in a restaurant was a "sale" within the 
meaning of statutes prohibiting sales of game, liquor, adulterated milk, etc. 
State v. Lotti, 72 Vt. us; Com. v. Warren, I6o Mass. 533; People v. Clair, 
221 N. Y. ro8; Com. v. Phoenix Co., 157 Ky. I8o; Com. v. Miller, r31 Pa. 
n8. This case, however, the court said, was the first case of its particular 
kind to come before a supreme appellate tribunal. The court held that 
neither by the common law nor in the sense of the Uniform Sales Act was 
the transaction between a restaurant keeper and a patron a "sale," and that 
as there was no "sale" there could be no implied warranty. The plaintiff was 
therefore denied recovery. (While the court seems to have been correct in 
its statement that no similar case had come before a supreme tribunal, such 
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cases had been before the intermediate courts of New York, in Leahy v . 
. Essex Co. (July, 1914), 148 N. Y. S. 1o63, and Race v. Krum (1913), 146 N. 
Y. S. 197, affirmed, 222 N. Y. 410, and in both cases the transaction had been 
held to be a sale.) A conclusion that such transactions are not sales was reach-
ed by the federal court in Valeri v. Piillman Co. (Dec., 1914), 218 Fed. 519. 
At this time there was apparent in other decisions a strong tendency to 
hold persons who prepare food for human consumption to be under a duty 
of so high a degree of care as to make them almost insurers of the fitness 
for use of such food. The unfitness of the food practically branded, per se, 
the one who had prepared it as negligent. In Parks v. Yost Pie Co. (Nov., 
1914), 93 Kan. 334, decided the same year as the Connecticut case, it ap-
peared that the plaintiff's husband had died as the result of poison in a pie 
prepared by defendant company and sold by it to a retailer, who, in turn, 
sold it to plaintiff's husband. "There was no privity of contract between 
plaintiff, or her husband, and the defendant on which any pretense of con-
tract could be based. The action was in tort, on the theory of negligence. 
No direct proof of negligence appears in the report of the case, nor is it 
even suggested. Nevertheless, a verdict for plaintiff was sustained on the 
ground that a manufacturer of food for human consumption is held to so 
high a degree of care, because of the serious consequences which might fol-
low negligence, that "Practically he must know it is fit or take the conse-
quences." (Citing Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N. J. L. 748). The Wash-
ington courts; in the preceding year, had reached the same conclusion, and 
held a defendant liable, in an action based on tort, without any proof of neg-
ligence other than the·fact that the food was unwholesome. Mazetti v. Ar-
mour & Co. (1913), 75 Wash. 622. In Jackso1i v. Cocoa Cola Co. (Mo., 
April, 1914), 64 So. 791, it appeared that plaintiff had found, too late, a 
swollen and mephitic mouse in Cocoa Cola bottled by the defendant and sold 
to a retailer, who resold to plaintiff. There was no evidence that the de-
fendant had been negligent in bottling the mouse. "How it happened is not 
told." The court held the bottler to be "under a legal duty to see to it 
that in the process of bottling no foreign substance shall be mixed with the 
beverage, which, if taken into the human stomach will be injurious,'' and that 
this duty is owing, "to the general public for whom his drinks are intended . 
as well as to the retailer to whom he sells." In a number of actions by 
patrons directly against the restaurant keeper whose unwholesome food had 
injured them, it had been held, "that every one ought to know the quali-
ties, good or bad, of the things which he fabricates in the exercise of the 
art, craft or business of which he makes public profession.*** He is 
therefore at fault if these articles prove to be vitiated or deleterious." 
Doyle v. Fuerst, 129 La. 838; Pantaze v. West. 7 Ala. App. 599. This liabil-
ity was denied only by an occasional case such as Valeri v. Pullman Co., 
218 Fed. 519, requiring only the carefulness of a reasonably prudent man, 
and Liggett & :Myers Tobacco Co. v. Canno1i (1915), 132 Tenn. 419, 14 
MrcH. L. REv. 164 The latter denied a manufacturer's liability for the pres-
ence of a bug in a plug of tobacco. This decision, however, was differen-
tiated on the ground that tobacco is not food, and might have been on the 
NOTE AND COMMENT 
ground that the damage resulting from a bug in chewing tobacco would be 
nominal at most. 
In view of this definite authority on either theory, the attorney might be 
pardoned who chose thereafter to sue a restaurant keeper on the theory of 
implied negligence rather than that of sale and implied warranty. In 1916, 
in Jacobs v. Childs Co., 166 N. Y. S. 798, "counsel for the plaintiff at first 
proceeded upon the theory of the defendant's implied warranty of the fit-
ness of the food for consumption; but subsequently moved to change the 
cause of action to one in tort predicated upon the negligence of the defend-
ant * * *" The plaintiff had been injured through biting on a nail hid-
den in a cake manufactured by the defendant and served in defendant's res-
taurant. The court denied liability of the defendant, on the ground that no 
negligence had been directly proved and that it could not be inferred from 
the facts of this case. It pointed out a distinction between a cake contain-
ing deleterious and unwholsome ingredients and a cake containing a foreign 
substance but otherwise fit for human consumption. The latter is not, the 
court said, like the former, a case of res ipsa loquitur, although "if the nail 
had been necessarily used in the making of the cake or were an integral part 
thereof, a different situation would be presented." (Citing Hasbrouck v. 
Armour & Co., 139 Wis. 357; distinguishing Watson v. Augusta Co., 124 
Ga., 121 and Garvey v. Nam11i, 121 N. Y. S. 442). A remarkably similar case 
was decided in the same way this year. Ash v. Childs Co. O•Iass., Sept., 
1918), 120 N. E. 3g6. The plaintiff was injured through biting on a tack in 
a piece of blueberry pie manufactured by defendant and supplied to plain-
tiff as a patron of its restaurant. The action was in tort, based on defend-
ant's negligence. No direct proof was presented and the court refused to 
apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquit11r. (Jacobs v. Childs Co., supra, was not 
cited.) The question of negligence was left to the jury in Greenwood Cafe 
v. Lcvi11ggood (1916), 197 Ala. 34 In Crigger v. Cocoa Cola Co. (1915), 132 
Tenn. 545, the action was based on averment of negligence, for damages 
resulting from plaintiff's having swallowed a long defunct mouse interred 
m Cocoa Cola, bottled by the defendant, and sold to a retailer, who sold to 
plaintiff. The court held that there was no implied warranty which would 
"run with the article" because the article was not "inherently dangerous,'' 
and that evidence of actual negligence was essential to recovery. Accord, 
Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257; in this case, however, the defendant while 
a dealer, had not prepared the article in any way relative to the defect. 
While the cases contemporaneous with Merrill v. H odsot1 were being thus 
disregarded and distinguished, counsel who, despite that case, stuck to the 
idea of sale and warranty were winning. In Friend v. Clzilds Co. (Mass., 
Sept., 191S), 120 N. E. 407 the plaintiff sued for injury suffe::ed through bit-
ing on a stone in a dish of baked beans prepared by defendant, and served 
in its restaurant. Here, again, there was no direct proof of negligence. 
And certainly the presence of a stone in the beans would no more justify 
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur than would the presence of a 
nail in the cake or a tack in the pie. But in this case the suit was based 
on the theory of "breach of an implied warranty of fitness to eat, in a 
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contract for food-." The court strongly leaned toward the position that the 
transaction was a "sale," but held that, in any event, it was a contract to 
furnish food, which contract impliedly contained a term that the food should 
be fit for use. In a somewhat startling case of the same year, Barrington v. 
Hotel Astor (July, 1918), 171 N. Y. S. 840, such a transaction was held un-
qualifiedly to be a sale. The plaintiff had ordered kidney saute in the de-
fendant's restaurant and was made violently sick by the discovery therein 
of a mouse, chopped in two. There was no direct proof of negligence, in-
deed the defense was that plaintiff had "planted" his own mouse in the 
dish with a view to such a suit. The court held that "under modern con-
ditions the food is sold and the hotel keeper impliedly warrants that it is 
wholesome to eat". Thus New York and Massachusetts seem fairly well 
settled on both theories, but otherwise the whole result is Biblical, authority 
for both sides upon either theory. J. B. W. 
BuRil~~ oF PRooF.-The case of Rowe, Ad111.-r. v. Colorado and Southern 
R. R. Co. ('l'ex. Civ. App. 1918), 205 S. W. 731, is typical of the confusion 
all too common in the use of this term "burden of proof". 
Mrs. Rowe, as administratrix of her deceased hus.band, brings her action 
to recover against the Railroad Company, for the benefit of herself, as widow 
of deceased, _and their minor children, for the injury resulting from the 
death of her husband, upon the theory that the death was caused by the 
negligence of the defendant companies. 
The negligence charged was defective condition of a car loaded with coal, 
and absence of proper inspection which would have discovered the defect. 
The court of Civil Appeals, in· an opinion granting a new trial upon the appli-
cation of the plaintiff, uses the language following: "The question of 
whether or not the car was inspected before being placed in charge of the 
train crew, was a fact lying peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellees, 
(Railroad Company), and the burden of proving it rested on them". It is a 
real misfortune that the use of this term "burden of proof" in legal discus-
sion can· not be confined to a single legal concept embodying a definite legal 
principle. One had reason to expect that the mass of enlightening discussion 
of this question in recent years would find its reflection in the opinions of 
the courts of last resort. It is still difficult to discover that it has had any 
marked effect. We still can find many illustrations of its use in very differ-
ent senses. 
It is not clear in what sense the court used the term in the case under 
discussion. Did the court in its use of the term mean that if there were no 
evidence offered by either party from which it could be determined whether 
or not the car was inspected, that the jury should be advised that it should 
find that it was not inspected because the burden was on the defendants to 
prove inspection? Or, if evidence were offered by both parties on this issue, 
did the court intend by what it said, to indicate that if the jury were to find 
such evidence so evenly balanced as that it could not tell where the prepon-
derance did lie, it would be the duty of the jury to find that there was no 
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inspection because the defendants had failed to lift the burden which was 
theirs? lf such be the meaning of what the court says, it is a declaration 
that the jury is to determine that the defendants are liable iri plaintiff's action 
for negligent injury although it is unable to find they were guilty of the 
negligence charged. In the clause immediately following the one quoted 
the court goes on to state that the plaintiff did introduce evidence from which 
the jury would be justified in concluding that the car was not inspected. 
It must be concluded then that the court does not use the term "burden 
of proof", as indicating the obligation which a party to civil litigation takes 
upon himself to establish those facts essential to his cause of action or affirm-
ative defense, by a preponderance of evidence, or be defeated of his cause 
of action or defense. As already indicated, it is difficult to attach any defi-
nite meaning to the words as used in the opinion in this case. Apparently 
the court is saying that some legal effect in the field of evidence is to be 
given to the fact that the means of proof of a particular fact are more 
accessible to one party than to the other. But what legal effect? Is it more 
than that the jury would be justified in taking something against a party 
shown to be in possession of evidence if he shall fail to produce it? 
Because no one may know so well as the defendant whether he be guilt} 
of the murder charged against him, are we to say that he shall have the 
burden of showing that he is innocent? Are we to say that because no one 
knows so well as the defendant whether he is the author of a libellous pub-
lication, that he is to be found guilty though no evidence be produced against 
him? No more is it true that because no one may know so well as the 
defendant whether he inspected a car wheel on a particular occasion, in an 
action charging him with that failure and depending upon proof of that fact, 
it is to be found that he did not inspect it though no evidence be produced 
upon the question. 
It may wen· be said, that if there is evidence upon the question, that the 
fact that the defendants are shown to be in better position than the plaintiffs 
to know whether there was inspection and to produce evidence of it, a fail-
ure on their part to do so might be considered by the jury, with the other 
evidence, in determining whether there was, or was not inspection. In other 
words the instruction might, under such circumstanoes, be justified, that the 
jury might find there was no inspection upon evidence having less probative 
value than would be justifiable if the contested fact were not one, the evi-
dence of which was peculiarly within the knowledge and control of the de-
fendants. 
Let us not give over pleading for the recognition, in all authoritative dec-
larations of law, of a single definite meaning for the term "burden of proof". 
It would be a real service to procedural law if so desirable a result could 
be accomplished. 
As previously indicated, that meaning of the term most nearly correct 
theoretically, and best supported upon authority, is one making it stand for 
the legal concept that parties in civil cases must establish their caust:s of 
action or defenses by a preponderance of the evidence; that an affirmative 
defense of a defendant in a criminal case must be established under the 
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same rule, and that the State must establish the facts essential to the guilt 
of the crime charged by evidence which satisfies the jury beyond any rea-
sonable doubt. 
The case of Lisbo1i v. L)•man, 49 N. H. 553, well illustrates a discriminat-
ing use of the term. Excellent discussions upon principle and authority can 
be found in Thayer's Preliminary Evidence at the Cammo1~ Law, p. 353, and 
in Wigmore's Evidence, §§ 2483 et seq. V. H. L. 
Tm~ VvnrTrnc R.i;QumEn To EsTABLrsH AN ExPREss TuusT oF LA.!'in.-It 
has frequently been said that the Seventh Section of the Statute of Frauds, 
concerning Trusts of land, requires a writing containing "all the terms of 
the trust." Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. 707; Smith v. Matthews, 3 DeG., F. & J. 
139; l.aring v. Palmer, II8 U. S. 321; Gaylord v. Lafayette, n5 Ind. 423; 
McClellan v. McClellan, 65 Me. 500; Blodgett v. Hildreth, 103 Mass. 484; 
Yark v. Perrine, 71 Mich. 567; Newkirk v. Place, 47 N. J. Eq. 477; Steere 
v. StP.ere, 5 Johns. Ch. I; Cook v. Barr, 44 N. Y. 156; Dillaye v. Greeno11gh, 
4~ N. Y. 438; D)•er's Appeal, 107 Pa. 446; 111cCandless v. Warner, 26 W. Va. 
754. This doctrine comes to the test in a case where there is a writing, 
signed by the person who is enabled to declare the trust, sufficiently identify-
ing the land, and declaring that it is held in trust, but without naming the 
beneficiaries or otherwise failing to meet the stated requirement, but where 
parol evidence sufficiently establishes the terms of the trust to enabl!> the 
court to enforce it if the Statute does not prevent. In such a case, does 
the Statute render the trust unenforcible? It is submitted that it does not. 
The policy of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent frauds through per-
jury, not generally but in particular classes of cases, selected and defined. 
we must assume, upon the theory that such frauds are more likely in these 
than in other cases, or would in these, if perpetrated, be more than com-
monly obnoxious, or that, in these cases, the imposition of the statutory 
requirements upon an honest claimant would involve less than ordinary hard-
ship. The method adopted to prevent such frauds in such cases is to relieve 
the putative victim from the necessity of meeting and disproving a claim 
supported only by parol, and presumably perjured, evidence, requiring in 
such cases higher evidence, usually a writing over the signature of the puta-
tive victim. The Statute is extremely concise, considering the complexity 
of the problems touched by it, and leaves much to judicial interpretation, as 
to the cases embraced, the character of the. writing required, and otherwise. 
Such interpretation should obviously proceed with the policy of the Statute 
clearly in view. 
The provisions touching trusts of land would seem to be designed to pro-
tect the beneficial owner from expropriation by judicial proceedings based 
on perjured parol evidence of a declaration of trust. If this be so, the only 
writing required to effectuate the policy of the statute is one identifying the 
land and clearly indicating that the person alleged to be a trustee has no 
beneficial interest therein, or only a specified interest. This position is 
squarely denied in Smith v. Matthew.•, supra. There counsel argued, "the 
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danger to be guarded against is the defrauding a man by establi~hing him 
to be a mere trustee on parol evidence," to which Turner, L. J., replied, "The 
statute was intended to guard against perjury as well as fraud. You let in 
the risk of perjury as between cestuis que tmst." 'Nith due respect, it is 
submitted that this dictum (for such it was) involves an unwarranted as-
sumption as to the policy of the Statute, and produces the absurd result of 
preventing perjury among the contending cestuis, some of whom, by hy-
pothesis, are entitled to the property, by taking the property from them all 
and giving it to the trustee, \vho has, by an adequate writing, been shown to 
have no beneficial interest. This sort of justice savors too much of A'!sop·s 
fables. Our case is distinguishable from that arising under the provision 
concerning contracts. There it may well be sound policy, and therefore 
presumably the intent of the statute, to require that the writing contain all 
the terms of the contract. Else, one who has been so ill advised as to sign 
a memorandum showing merely that there is a contract might have a con-
fiscatory bargain thrust upon him by perjury. We might say that the normal 
contract case is like the exceptional trust case where there is a trust as to a 
partial interest only, the trustee being beneficial owner in part, in which 
case it seems essential that the writing show the trustee's intere~t, or, to put 
it the other way, the extent of the trusteeship. In both cases the putative 
victim of the putative fraud may be as vitally concerned with certain terms 
of the contract or trust as with its existence. Distinctions might also be 
based upon differences of phraseology between the fourth and the seventh 
sections of the Statute, but, as the language is not explicit in either, policy 
seems to be surer ground. 
The cases cited above, as asserting that the writing must contain all the 
terms of the trust, prove upon scrutiny to be but slight authority for that 
doctrine. In several of them, the court would have reached the same con-
clusion without any statute, because it found that the evidence, written and 
parol, was, at most, ambiguous and insufficient to raise the burden of proof. 
In Dillaye v. Greenough, there was apparently no evidence whatever, either 
written or parol, to identify the beneficiaries. In others of the cases, though 
the parol evidence might have established a trust, the writing was inadequate 
under any theory, containing but the remotest hint that there might be a 
trust, or indicating but a promise, without consideration, to create a trust, 
or failing to identify the subject matter, under which last head may be 
ranged those cases where a parcel of land was identified but it appeared that 
the trustee had some beneficial interest and the w.riting did not disclose the 
extent of the trusteeship. Again, in several of the cases the doctrine was 
not applied, the trust being established and enforced upon a finding that the 
writing satisfied the stated requirement. But, of these last mentioned cases, 
two would seem to be, upon their facts, authorities against their own dicta, 
and even to go beyond the position here advanced. Such, are Loring v. Pal-
mer and Newkirk v. Place. In the latter the writings contained no descrip-
tion, formal or informal, of the land, but the court relied upo::i admissions 
at the hearing that they referred to the land in question. It is obvious that 
this goes far beyond the disputed doctrine that an answer admitting the trust 
268 MICHIGAN LAW REVI~W 
is a sufficient writing, though it pleads the statute as a defence, and it is also 
obvious that a similar ruling would not be made upon a parallel case of con-
tract of ~ale. In the former case, the court pieces together several writings 
which are not connected within the principle of incorporation by reference, 
and even then finds itself faced by the case of a trustee with a beneficial 
interest, the extent of which does not appear in the writings, from which 
position it purports to find escape by means of a "presumption" that the shares 
were equal. One has only to consider what the court would have done if 
the parol evidence, instead of indicating equal shares, as it did, had indi-
cated a different proportion, to see that the presumption theory was of the 
nature of a beneficent fiction indulged to avoid the necessity of taking bolder 
ground. To these cases we may add two Illinois decisions which frankly 
accept the theory here maintained. Kingsbury v. Burnside, 58 Ill. 310; Myers 
v. M:y,•ers, I67 Ill. 52. See also, Railroad v. Durant, 95 U. S. 576, and cases 
cited by BROWNt, STATUTE OF FRAUDS, § III. The only clear authority to the 
contrary seems to be Dyer's Appeal, supra. It is therefore submitted that 
authority, as well as principle, is opposed to the doctrine that all the terms 
of the trust must be contained in the writing. 
It should be noted that the acceptance of that doctrine would be much 
more serious in this country than in England, because of 011r conservatism 
upon the raising of constructive trusts to prevent unjust enrichment through 
the breach of parol trusts. I2 MICH. L. Rtv. 423, 5I5; 28 HARV. L. Rtv. 
237, 366. E. N. D. 
